September 26, 2026 — James Jedlic

The Erosion of the Secular State Under Kennedy v. Bremerton

The separation of church and state is deeply embedded in our country's legal framework. When religion creeps into government, the government can manipulate people into submission and consolidate power away from them using their faith. It is because of these potential consequences that our government must maintain complete neutrality concerning religion. The government has both the power and the obligation to limit an individual's freedom to practice their faith when their actions conflict with the government's duty to remain neutral. While personal rights are important, the government has a responsibility to ensure that no single religion is favored, which, until recently, was directly supported by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, protecting the rights and freedoms of all citizens at the partial expense of one. Under Kennedy v. Bremerton, the Supreme Court diminished that responsibility. To appreciate the Court’s reasoning and the significance of its decision, it is necessary to understand the cultural history of religion in America, the constitutional bases for action, and the legal precedents that informed the Court during its deliberations.

The history of religion in the US, and the colonies before it, is complex and still extremely relevant to modern-day politics. The colonies were founded by Puritans who left Europe because they believed the people there were morally corrupt and no longer followed the Bible closely enough. For a while after the Puritans landed, they had complete theocratic control over their colonies—especially after British and colonial forces defeated the Catholic French during the French Indian War. Although the original thirteen colonies did not widely accept other religions, there were some early examples of religious pluralism. In 1649, the colony of Maine was the first to pass legislation creating “religious freedom for all citizens, but only on the condition that those of 'contrary' religious beliefs behaved ‘acceptably’" (Cline). However, such progress has long been overshadowed by a history of Puritans abusing power and abusing citizens using religious justifications. When eight Quakers arrived in Boston, for example, “they were immediately imprisoned by the Puritan authorities because Quakers were generally regarded as politically and religiously subversive” (Cline). Arresting people based solely on religious judgment is illegal in most modern societies. However, during that era, people felt that these laws were necessary to protect the colonies from “destruction by material or ideological enemies” (Miller 6).

The Puritans also caused one of the most well-known theocratic injustices in the US: the Salem Witch Trials. The Trials began when several women and children in Salem, Massachusetts, were arrested and accused of witchcraft. Most were put to death because, as Arthur Miller states in his introduction to The Crucible, “their universe was absolute, lacking in ambivalence” (Miller 8). The Puritans' absolute faith left no room for citizens to question their government. Theocracies have many issues, among them the belief that their god is infallible and therefore their leaders, chosen by god, must be infallible as well. The lack of accountability for leaders in theocracies leaves no room for citizens to push back against abuses of power. The Founding Fathers recognized that religion can be used not only to influence citizens but to exert absolute control over them. They stressed the need for a separation of church and state to prevent that exact contamination of government.

Even into the 1700s, the ruling class still used religion to control people. Colonial South Carolina passed a “Sunday Law” which required everyone to “attend church each Sunday and to refrain from both skilled labor and traveling by horse or wagon beyond what was absolutely necessary” (Cline). The most well-known time this law was enforced is in the case of Captain Kemble of Boston, Massachusetts, who, in 1659, was “locked in the public stocks for two hours for kissing his wife on the Sabbath after spending three years at sea” (Sheepdog). The absurdity of this case serves to show how unreasonable religious-based laws can be. When President Buchanan faced pressure to replace the Mormon governor of Utah, Brigham Young, in 1857, he decided to send troops with the replacement to ensure that nothing went wrong. Young saw this action as the federal government trying to oppress the Mormon people. In retaliation, “under his authority as governor, Young declared martial law and deployed the local militia, the Nauvoo Legion, to delay the troops” (The Utah War). The misunderstanding led to an intense standoff during which Mormons in the state were instructed to burn their possessions rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the government. Buchanan’s Blunder, as it became known, is yet another example of citizens suffering because of a fear of religious persecution and a blind following in faith rather than logic. All of these cases result from an entanglement of church and state, clearly underlining why that separation is so important.

Even with only a brief history of religious oppression in the US, it is easy to see why there is so much pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve the tension between these institutions. It also makes the Court’s decision to overturn precedent in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District more shocking. The Kennedy case arose when high school coach Joseph Kennedy held post-game prayers at midfield after football games. The school district, trying to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, told him to stop. When he refused, he was placed on leave and ultimately fired. Kennedy sued the school board, arguing that it had violated his individual rights. When lower courts affirmed the board’s action, he appealed his case to the Supreme Court.

Kennedy invoked both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" (US Const. amend. I, sec. 1). The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government hostility toward religious expression. While the writing for both is clear, they frequently conflict with each other. According to prior case law, "The Establishment Clause bars the government from providing certain types of support for religion, while the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government hostility to religion. Together, the Religion Clauses require the government to be neutral toward religion" (Brannon). Typically, when the two clauses conflict, the Establishment Clause is treated as the ceiling for government action. The government accommodates religion but cannot promote it, which leaves the task of determining priority up to the courts. When making its decision to fire Kennedy, the Bremerton school district acted under its obligation to comply with the Establishment Clause as interpreted by precedent, including that which was set in Engel v. Vitale and Abington v. Schempp. The Court in both of these cases found school-sponsored or school-facilitated prayer to be unconstitutional regardless of whether participation was voluntary.

To rule on Kennedy v. Bremerton, the Supreme Court needed to resolve two main legal questions. First, does a public school employee's personal religious exercise on school grounds, in view of students, constitute government-sponsored religion under the Establishment Clause? Second, does the school district's restriction on Kennedy's prayer violate his free exercise and free speech rights under the First Amendment? Kennedy argued that he did not endorse religion on behalf of the government and that the school violated his right to express his faith. In the end, the Court ruled 6-3 in favor of Kennedy.

Critics of this decision might look to previous rulings to dispute the Court’s logic with its own reasoning. The first case to review is McCollum v. Board of Education. The school board in Champaign, Illinois, allowed religious teachers to enter public school buildings and hold weekly classes during normal school hours. Students opted in during regular class time. Because religious teachers used government buildings and the mandatory school system to deliver instruction, the Supreme Court ruled 8–1 that the instruction was unconstitutional. The Court found that using mandatory public school infrastructure to deliver religious instruction blurred the line between church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause. This ruling's reach is limited by Zorach v. Clauson, which allowed students to be released from campus for religious instruction. However, the key distinction is that the government was not directly hosting the activity. In Bremerton, students were still on school property, making Kennedy’s prayer subject to the precedent set by McCollum. His use of school grounds and his role as a school employee during a school event are directly governed by this ruling.

A second case to review is Abington School District v. Schempp, which considered whether religious practices can be used in secular ways by the government. In 1963, Pennsylvania required public schools to open each day with Bible readings and recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The Schempp family sued, arguing it violated the Establishment Clause. The Court ruled 8–1 that the Bible reading and voluntary prayer were unconstitutional. The government must remain neutral on religion, and facilitating religious activity in schools violates that neutrality regardless of whether student participation is technically voluntary. The Kennedy ruling runs contrary to two points made in this case. First, the lawyer arguing in favor of school Bible reading conceded on the record that "Because of the nature of a prayer, I think the prayer in Engel v. Vitale, and any prayer, to me, has no secular meaning." He further acknowledged that prayer is a "purely religious act" with no alternative justification (citation). Any argument that Kennedy's post-game prayer was something other than pure religious expression is invalidated by the lawyer's argument that there is no alternative meaning to prayer. Second, the same lawyer acknowledged that even voluntary religious activity creates pressure on students: "I think there's pressure on the child that's excused from the flag salute… even suggesting that children do it, there may be a compulsion on the child" (citation). The Bremerton school district was attempting to prevent exactly this dynamic when it instructed Kennedy to stop his sideline prayer.

Although both McCollum and Schempp are fairly clear regarding the government's stance on religion in public schools, Engel v. Vitale removes any doubt regarding the constitutionality of voluntary prayer in public schools. Engel v. Vitale arose when New York's Board of Regents authorized a short, nondenominational prayer to be recited at the start of each public school day. Students could excuse themselves. Parents sued, arguing that even voluntary state-composed prayer violated the Establishment Clause. The Court once again ruled 6–1 that the law was unconstitutional. Justice Hugo Black wrote that it is not the government's role to create official prayers for any group of Americans as part of a government-sponsored religious program. The Court affirmed that the voluntary nature of the policy did not make it constitutional, setting a precedent that should have nullifiedKennedy’s claim sixty years later. The ruling was deeply unpopular at the time, provoking public backlash and calls to impeach justices, yet it was directly affirmed the following year in Schempp. The Court later extended its logic to strike down clergy-led prayers at graduation ceremonies and student-led prayers at football games. Kennedy v. Bremerton runs against this entire line of precedent and raises questions about the Supreme Court’s reasoning.

In Kennedy v. Bremerton, the Court held that Kennedy’s post-game prayer was a personal religious expression protected by the First Amendment and did not violate the Establishment Clause. Consequently, the majority replaced the Lemon test with a new "historical practices and understandings" standard for evaluating Establishment Clause claims. However, they never fully explained how Kennedy's specific conduct passed that new test. The University of Chicago Law Review offers several possible rationales: There was no direct student coercion, the prayer did not resemble the hallmarks of a Founding-era establishment, the Establishment Clause historically targeted federal institutions rather than individuals, and the school district's suppression of Kennedy's speech could itself be characterized as "establishing secularism" (Ashman). The opinion was widely criticized as vague and inconsistent. Dissenting justices argued that abandoning the Lemon test without clearly defining its replacement would provoke litigation and leave the lower courts without a workable standard. Legal scholars noted that the decision sits uneasily beside decades of precedent, particularly Engel and Schempp. If the government cannot sponsor voluntary prayer, and if even voluntary participation creates implicit pressure on students, then allowing a public school coach to pray conspicuously on the field after games—in a role of authority over those same students—does not work with the Court's own prior reasoning. Kennedy's prayer was not a quiet, private moment because it took place at midfield, after games, in front of students and the public, in his capacity as a government employee. The dissenters viewed this as exactly the kind of government entanglement with religion that the Establishment Clause was written to prevent.

The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn precedent in this case obscures the clarity needed by lower courts to interpret the Establishment Clause. Judges must now interpret what "historical practices and understandings" means case by case, producing inconsistent rulings across circuits. The ambiguity is especially damaging since the government's obligation to remain neutral toward religion depends on predictable legal standards. A vague ruling does not protect that neutrality. In fact, it does the opposite by relocating the conflict to lower courts, where harmful interpretations can take root before the Court can correct them. Moreover, the decision almost directly allows prayer in schools. Kennedy v. Bremerton establishes, at a minimum, that a public school employee can pray visibly and repeatedly in front of students without representing the government. In practice, students, particularly those on Kennedy's team who depended on playing time and his goodwill, face the same implicit pressure identified in Abington: even a technically voluntary religious act, when performed by someone in authority, can feel compulsory. The Court already recognized this dynamic and ruled against it in prior cases. Allowing it here undermines the equal protection of students who do not share their coach's faith.

The Court's decision in Kennedy v. Bremerton goes directly against three key pillars of ???. First, the cultural and legal history of government-sponsored religious activity in public schools being ruled unconstitutional. Second, the rights in the Constitution itself, which, through the Establishment Clause, prohibit any government support for religion regardless of voluntariness. And finally, a long line of legal precedent (ie, McCollum, Engel, Schempp) that the majority did not acknowledge or justify overruling. The government has both the power and the obligation to limit an individual's freedom to practice religion. The decision by the Court in this case directly contradicts precedent. The court must revisit its decision to clarify precedent and justify its complete disregard for previous decisions. The Court's ruling in Kennedy v. Bremerton will continue to undermine the separation of church and state in public education until we demand that the Court apply consistent, principled standards to Establishment Clause cases. Standards that were built to protect every student from the pressure of a biased government fighting to force a faith on citizens. If we do not fight against this overreach, we as a society will edge dangerously close to a puritanical theocracy. A form of government that directly defies the principles on which the United States was founded.

Works Cited:

“The Utah War.” History to Go, historytogo.utah.gov/utah-war/.

Sheepdog. “Sunday Laws in America.” Kingdomtruther.com, 29 May 2022, kingdomtruther.com/sunday-laws-in-america/. Accessed 8 May 2026.

Ashman, Tyler. “The Establishment of Originalism in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District | the University of Chicago Law Review.” Lawreview.uchicago.edu, lawreview.uchicago.edu/online-archive/establishment-originalism-kennedy-v-bremerton-school-district.

Brannon, Valerie C. “Kennedy v. Bremerton School District: School Prayer and the Establishment Clause.” Congress.gov, 2025, www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB10780.

United States Constitution. Amend. I, Sec. 1.

Cline, Austin. “A History of American Religion: 1600 - 2004.” Learn Religions, 2017, www.learnreligions.com/history-of-american-religion-timeline-4079964.

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577. Supreme Court of the United States, 1992.

"Kennedy v. Bremerton School District." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-418. Accessed 15 May. 2026.

"School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1962/142. Accessed 15 May. 2026.

"Engel v. Vitale." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1961/468. Accessed 15 May. 2026.

"Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/333us203. Accessed 15 May. 2026.